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The purpose of this paper is to trace the genesis of Pigou's interest
in unemployment by surveying his early works on the poverty and on
unemployment. Activists or social workers of the time like C. Booth
whose well-known research on poverty led to the Poor Law Reform and
Liberal Welfare Reform in the early 20th century had a considerable
impact on Pigou's early works, and prompt him to tackle the poverty
problem of his time. Indeed, we can see the origin of his welfare
economics there and, especially in the 1908-1912 period, we see also
the formation process for his unemployment theory which was essential
in the completion of his ¯rst major book, Wealth and Welfare (1912).
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\Those mute myriads that speak loud to us:
Men with the wives, and women with the babes,
And all these making prayer to only live!"
(Anonymous, Pigou 1901a: 237)
1. Introduction
The most serious weakness of the conventional understanding of Pigou's
welfare economics is that it has been overly colored by controversies
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that occurred in later years. Among them, the most in°uential are those
concerning the \second proposition"1) of his welfare economics and the
\Keynesian revolution." As a result, to date, his practical economics
have been studied from very partial viewpoints. Here, I take an approach
that di®ers from that of such studies.
Pigou's ¯rst major book, Wealth and Welfare (1912) is considered
\the true ¯rst edition" (Pigou and Collard 1999, vol. 1, x) of The
Economics of Welfare2). The composition process of Wealth and Welfare,
and therefore his welfare economics, can be studied along various lines,
including his fellowship theses (Pigou 1901b, 1901c; McLure 2013),
his controversial commitment to free trade (e.g., Pigou 1903a, 1906a,
1906b)3), his ethical thought (Pigou 1901b, 1907c, 1908a; O'Donnell
1979), his interest in labor problems (Pigou 1905), and his analysis of
surplus (Pigou 1904b, 1910a), among others4).
1) Three propositions or criteria of Pigou's welfare economics are as follows.
The economic welfare of the community is likely to be augmented (1) \if
a cause is introduced, which makes for an increase in the aggregate size
of the net national dividend, provided that the absolute share of no group
of members, in terms of the commodities which that group is accustomed
chie°y to consume, decreases," (2) \if a cause is introduced, which makes
for an absolute share of relatively poor groups of persons (in terms of the
commodities which those groups are accustomed chie°y to consume), provided
that the magnitude of the aggregate national dividend does not decrease," or
(3) \if a cause is introduced, which diminishes the variability, or inequality
in time, of the dividend, and especially of that part of it which accrues to
the poorer classes" (Pigou 1912: x).
2) The Economics of Welfare was \originally conceived as a rewritten and
revised edition of [Pigou's] Wealth and Welfare published in 1912" (Pigou
1920: v).
3) As David Collard says, \it may come as a surprise to some modern readers
that Pigou's early work was mainly in international trade" (Pigou and Collard
2002, vol. 1: xi).
4) There exists very little study of Pigou prior to his publication of Wealth and
Welfare, but the controversy on \the appointment of Pigou as Marshall's
successor" (Coase 1972, Coats 1968 and 1972, Jones 1978) is famous.
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Here, however, I focus on two other elements: Pigou's early works
on the poverty problem, which include charity and Poor Law Reform,
and those on the unemployment problem. These two problems closely
correlate, in the sense that he needed to study unemployment in order
to resolve the problem of poverty, with the former being one of the
foremost causes of the latter. In the early 20th century, unemployment
was considered a mere problem that charity or the Poor Law could
relieve (Hutchison 1953: 410): the causes of unemployment were not
analyzed systematically by academic economists.
Poverty, which derives from both individual-level and social factors,
cannot be resolved by the mere transfer of money or material goods.
To support the poor, it is essential that professional activities guide the
lives of the poor towards \independence." This is Pigou's fundamental
view on charity, an idea common to many of today's social work
activities. Needless to say, he considered other means (e.g., various
kinds of insurance, Poor Law relief, and even public work in helping
the unemployed) necessary as well.
In Sections 2 and 3, we take up two works of Pigou to show how
he tried to ¯ght poverty, that is, \Some Aspects of the Problem of
Charity" (Pigou 1901a) and \Memorandum on Some Economic Aspects
and E®ects of Poor Law Relief" (Pigou 1907a). Then, in Section 4, we
consider \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness" (Pigou 1911), a work,
though little known, that is very important to consider, if we are to
trace the development of his employment theory, and the formation of
his welfare economics.
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2. Discovery of Poverty
2-1 The In°uence of Activists on Early Pigou
\Some Aspects of the Problem of Charity" (Pigou 1901a) is, though
having been largely neglected in the secondary literature, one of Pigou's
earliest writings on a social problem rather than on a philosophical
or ethical problem, like that in his ¯rst book, Robert Browning as a
Religious Teacher (Pigou 1901b). This article on charity clearly shows
young Pigou's \social enthusiasm" (Pigou 1908b: 13). Its raison d'e^tre
is to establish the principles of charity in order to assist such persons
as widows, the aged, the handicapped, and the unemployed. According
to Pigou, the condition of the people of Great Britain as a whole had
greatly improved during the 19th century, but there was still \a vast
problem before the statesman and the philanthropist" (Pigou 1901a:
236).
It must be observed here that the word \charity" is distinguished
strictly from general philanthropy \the practice of many amateur
philanthropists" (247), \foolish benevolence," or \misdirected kindness"
(248) and is rather similar to today's social casework. The activity
of charity is not merely about giving money and goods. It looks also
\to alleviate distress without injuring character, and with the hope even
of elevating it in the process"; therefore \the social worker, also, must
deal with causes [of each case of distress] and not with their results,
if his work is to be really useful" (240). Accordingly, says Pigou, the
following philosophical problem on \ultimate good" should not occur
within the realm of charity.
There are some philosophers who maintain that the ultimate goal,
for which all men should strive, is the realization of the greatest
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possible sum of pleasurable feeling in the world, and there are others
who hold that character and not happiness is the all-important
thing. Fortunately it is unnecessary for any one engaged in the
practical work of charity to decide between these two views, because
his course of action would have to be very much the same whichever
he adopted. Thus, whatever view he may take about the \ultimate
good", his direct aim is to improve both character and material
conditions (239)5).
At the beginning of this article, Pigou confesses that he had no
direct practical life experience in the poorer parts of London6), and
that he was indebted to C. Booth, A. Marshall, O. Hill7), C. Barnett,
C.S. Loch, Mrs. B. Bosanquet, and others for their insights; most of
these individuals also a®ected the Poor Law Reform. Especially, Pigou
mentions the result of Booth's well-known research on poverty in London:
\Mr. Charles Booth estimates that 30 per cent of the population of
London are either `poor' or `very poor', the `poor' being those who
have a su±ciently regular though bare income, such as 18s. to 21s. per
week for a moderate family [parents and three children], and the `very
poor' those who, from any cause, fall much below this standard" (237).
As Pigou had originally studied philosophy and submitted to King's
5) Pigou regards \the spirit of independence" as one of the elements that
constitute the ultimate good or welfare. To understand his philosophical
conception of \welfare," we should refer to \The Problem of Good" (Pigou
1908a: Chapter 4).
6) In later years, Pigou re°ected on his life and work, and told students that
economists, especially when they are young, should endeavor to learn not
only from the reading of printed pages, but also more from direct experience
in the real world (Pigou 1935: 11-12).
7) Pigou often praises Hill's activities (Pigou 1912: 22n, Rowntree and Pigou
1914: 49).
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College a fellowship thesis on Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher,
why did he decide to become an economist? Indeed, in this respect, his
own explanation is somewhat obscure: \The cause of my ¯rst interest
in economic science was not a reason, but the personal inspiration of
the master whose successor and whose pupil it is my high privilege to
be" (Pigou 1908b: 7). However, as an important reason, we may point
out that along with Marshall's \personal inspiration," Pigou had an
interest in the great problem of poverty as discovered by Booth and
other activists. On the title page of Wealth and Welfare, we see the
motto: \Discontent, to be e®ective, must be shot with the colours of
hope Charles Booth"8). Thus, it is evident that Booth had in°uenced
the young Pigou.
The use of this motto from Booth points to the basic character of
Pigou's welfare economics, already evidenced in the use of the words
\social enthusiasm" in Pigou's inaugural lecture at Cambridge, Economic
Science in Relation to Practice. According to him, those who feel
such \enthusiasm" most strongly are not always economists; on the
contrary, he says, as a result of there being much inquiry and little
action, economics is sometimes criticized by activists as \a common
anathema" (Pigou 1908b: 12). Thus, Pigou insists that economists share
the enthusiasm with them: \I shall be far more glad if he comes [to
economics] because he was walked through the slums of London and
is stirred to make some e®ort to help his fellow-men. Wonder, Carlyle
said, is the beginning of philosophy: social enthusiasm, one might add,
is the beginning of economic science" (Pigou 1908b: 13). Many scholars
have conventionally pointed out that the most in°uential ¯gures to early
Pigou are A. Marshall and H. Sidgwick, both of Cambridge. Though
8) Unfortunately, this motto is omitted from Wealth and Welfare as reproduced
by Collard (Pigou and Collard 1999, vol. 2).
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this is undoubtedly correct, Pigou indeed paid considerable respect also
to activists.
2-2 Principles of Charity
Pigou lays down three principles of charity: (1) a con¯dential or
friendly relationship between a person who helps and a person who is
helped, (2) careful examination into the causes of distress, and (3) the
determination of an appropriate way of granting assistance.
The con¯dential human relationship is the most fundamental principle:
\There is, indeed, one form of help which is equally applicable to all
cases of distress, whatever their origin may have been. This is that
personal sympathy and advice which is always in the power of real
friends to give.¢ ¢ ¢ " (Pigou 1901a: 240). Since material distress is largely
also an issue of character, \the steady exercise of personal in°uence,
of kindly counsel, and sincere and open friendship is an integral part
of all genuine charitable work" (257)9). Such a human relationship is
essential to charity of any form, because any examination or investigation
into a case would fail without it. Pigou adds that, generally speaking,
local churches and chapels have many advantages as centers of charity,
because \the ties between their members are generally closer than those
subsisting between mere neighbours" (261).
The appropriate way of granting assistance where material help
(including money transfers) may be frequently needed must be decided
on the basis of examinations into the causes of distress. Stressing the need
9) The same point is emphasized also in Wealth and Welfare (Pigou 1912:
361-362) and \Private Use of Money" (Pigou 1922: 454-455). In particular, in
the latter work, Pigou lays down three principles for gifts to the poor: (1)
they need to be constructive, (2) they need to be devised so as to evoke
in the recipient a spirit of co-operation rather than one of mere passive
receptivity, and (3) they need to nurture \the communism of friendship" (i.e.,
the gift should be given as from friend to friend).
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to classify various cases of distress, Pigou broadly classi¯es them into two
groups: one is due to some temporary misfortune; the other, to chronic
factors. The former group consists of the temporarily unemployed and
the sick, inter alia; the latter mainly consists of the aged and those who
are called the \submerged Tenth," including the handicapped (241-242).
What Pigou criticizes most severely is the giving of indiscriminate
material assistance to the temporarily distressed, saying that doing so
can destroy \the spirit of independence." As a typical example of such
so-called harmful assistance, he refers to the Speenhamland system.
Since the argument clearly indicates his basic view on the problem of
poverty and, therefore, on redistribution policy in general I wish
to quote him at length:
The Speenhamland justices [¢ ¢ ¢ ] decided in 1795 that whenever
anyone in their district was earning wages below a certain ¯xed
sum the de¯ciency should be made up out of the rates. The more
numerous a man's family the greater was the income guaranteed
to him. This policy was soon adopted all over the country, with
the most disastrous results. The condition of those who failed to
support themselves became better than that of those who, by hard
e®ort, maintained their independence, for the latter were obliged
to contribute towards the support of the former. There was no
longer any check upon early marriage and large families, since every
additional child meant an extra dole of eighteen pence a week from
the parish. Consequently, the cost of poor relief rose by leaps and
bounds, and the spirit of independence among the working classes
was almost entirely destroyed. The o®er of indiscriminate assistance
to paupers had the e®ect of making paupers of many who had until
then been independent. The stringent Poor Law Reform of 1834
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put an end to the Speenhamland system, but its disastrous e®ects
upon the working classes have hardly yet been eliminated (Pigou
1901a: 250-251).
Insurance10) is also an e®ective means of preventing many cases of
temporary distress. Therefore, the ¯rst step in providing assistance is
to recommend that people partake in insurance schemes provided by
out-of-work-bene¯t associations, sick-bene¯t clubs, and the like. The
second step is to give material help in cases where individuals could not
join in these schemes for some reason. Whenever providing material help,
however, careful evaluation is needed. For example, in the case of a man
su®ering from unemployment, (1) if the cause of his unemployment was
normal seasonal variation in the industry in which he was accustomed
to engaging, the provision of material help would be dangerous (i.e.,
adversely enabling). On the other hand, (2) if the cause of it was
one that he could not fairly have expected, and if there had been no
unemployment bene¯t association he could have joined, it would be
wise to give material help until he found a new job. Additionally, (3)
if the cause of unemployment was a decline in the occupation, the
person must either be taught a new occupation or be helped to move
to a new place where his or her kind of labor would be in demand.
In short, these charitable activities must all be constructive, in light of
their ultimate end. Although he had been somewhat optimistic, Pigou
10) It should be noted that Pigou chie°y argues for private insurance. It seems
that he had been rather skeptical of public insurance: he says that \any
general centrally organized scheme would be dangerous as well as costly," and
that \the best way to deal with the question [of old-age pauperism] is by
careful local inquiry into the merits and needs of individual cases" (Pigou
1901a: 247). See also his contributions on \Old-Age Pensions" to the Times
(Pigou 1907b, 1908c).
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thought that most cases of temporary distress could be resolved through
the establishment of such principles of charity and the development of
voluntary insurance (Pigou 1901a: 253-255).
Under the aforementioned principles, an able-bodied person who
receives material support must meet certain requirements, if he or she is
to continue to receive it. In this respect, the principles that emphasize
self-help align with the idea of workfare policy, which has become popular
today. In addition, the combination of private and public activities is
of vital importance in Pigou's welfare society.
On the other hand, the problem of how chronic poverty should be
treated was far more di±cult for Pigou. In considering the development
of his welfare economics, an especially important issue seems to be
whether eugenics-oriented policies, such as those involving birth control,
should be used to reduce chronic poverty stemming from genetic factors.
Being anxious about \the violent interference with individual liberty,"
he did not recommend the immediate adoption of such policies (Pigou
1901a: 6). His position on eugenics was not evident until the publication
of \Social Improvement in the Light of Modern Biology" (Pigou 1907c)
and Wealth and Welfare (Part I, Chapter IV, \The National Dividend
and the Quality of the People").
3. Poor Law Reform
3-1 Poor Law, Charity, and Insurance
In 1907, Pigou submitted the \Memorandum on Some Economic
Aspects and E®ects of Poor Law Relief" (Pigou 1907a) to the Royal
Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. It was his ¯rst occasion
to commit to the policy of the country. Among the various works of
early Pigou to predate Wealth and Welfare (1912), this memorandum
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is the most comprehensive consideration of practical measures against
the poverty problem; therefore, it is of considerable signi¯cance in the
creation of that book.
In this memorandum, Pigou de¯nes some key terms and limits the
spheres of Poor Law relief. He de¯nes a destitute person as one
who \for the time being [is] without material resources appropriate for
satisfying such of his physical needs as actually exist or are likely to
arise immediately," where \physical needs" refers to those \that must
be satis¯ed in order to maintain life or to obviate, mitigate or remove
causes likely to endanger life or impair health or bodily ¯tness for
self-support." Says Pigou: \It is the duty of Poor Law o±cers to relieve
all these [destitute] persons," and \it is illegal for them to relieve any
other persons" (1907a: 981).
In addition, Pigou lists the three principal elements upon which
\well-being" depends; that is, \(1) the people themselves as ethical
personalities, (2) the direct social and other relations of people with
one another, and the satisfactions that result therefrom, [and] (3) the
satisfactions obtained by the people from their economic circumstances"
(1907a: 981-982). He says that \economic virtues" are included in the
¯rst element. The concept of well-being as a whole, as discussed above,
is thought to be equivalent to that of \welfare," and the third element
to that of \economic welfare."
The relationship between Poor Law and voluntary charity is discussed
in both \Some Aspects of the Problem of Charity" (Pigou 1901a) and
the aforementioned \Memorandum" (Pigou 1907a, Chapter 2 \The Poor
Law and Private Charity"). He maintains that the Poor Law guardians
and voluntary charitable agencies should work together, because they
are so intimately connected that it is impossible to say what one of
them ought to do, without knowing exactly what the other is doing.
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To enhance the e±ciency of relief work overall, says Pigou, the various
relief agencies need to be interlocked (1901a: 258-259).
According to Pigou, the relief work generated in the name of the
Poor Law derives from a comparatively centralized system; it is suited
for dealing with simple cases of destitution, for which a test rather than
a special inquiry can be applied. On the other hand, when it comes to
work that requires careful discrimination such as the administration
of outdoor relief or the care of those of deserving age Poor Law
agencies are less suitable than charitable agencies. In rural areas, however,
voluntary charity may be ill-organized and would not, in many cases,
be able to raise the necessary funds. Taking these circumstances into
consideration, Pigou concludes that \when these [charitable] bodies are
thoroughly organized, and in receipt of adequate funds, outdoor relief
on the part of the Guardians might with advantage be abandoned"
(1901a: 259). The same proposal is seen in the \Memorandum" (Pigou
1907a: 982-984) and in Wealth and Welfare (Pigou 1912: 358-359).
One of the most important roles of Poor Law is its guarantee of a
minimum standard of living. There was broad agreement among the
Royal Commissioners with regard to the necessity of categorizing persons
according to the cause of their destitution, and of treating each category
of persons in a particular fashion. In the same way, Pigou categorizes
those causes11) and proposes that \the minimum guaranteed to the
di®erent categories must be di®erent" (1907a: 991); particularly with
respect to the able-bodied12), he agrees that the traditional principle
11) These are (1) unemployment, (2) slight sickness or accident, (3) grave sickness
or accident, (4) impotency due to disablement or old age, and (5) impotency
due to tender years (Pigou 1907a: 991).
12) Pigou denies that the \principles of 1834 can be extended unreservedly to
categories of poor other than the able-bodied" (Pigou 1907a: 993). Therefore,
the not-able-bodied can be guaranteed a somewhat higher minimum level of
material support.
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of less eligibility is \still of considerable importance and ought not to
be violated" (992). At ¯rst glance, he may seem to be coldhearted to
the poor; however, this is not necessarily so. He endeavored to pursue
the means that are compatible with economic principles. This was his
fundamental stance, not only in early years, but also in later years, as
an economics student.
Pigou opines that one reason why the poor do not make provisions
against various risks could be \the imperfection of the machinery of
insurance" (993, italics in the original). Therefore, Pigou asserts that we
need to improve upon that machinery and make it more attractive for
the poor by combining old-age insurance with sickness and life insurance,
for example, or by permitting a pension, adjusted on a prorated basis,
to begin whenever the insured person wishes (993).
3-2 Unemployment Problem
Even around 1910, unemployment was still considered a problem of
charity or Poor Law relief, and it was a very important and di±cult
issue for most of the Poor Law Commissioners. In fact, the standard
economic theory on employment or on the business cycle scarcely existed
yet, at least in the English-speaking world. Although W.H. Beveridge's
pioneering monograph Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (1909)
which was in°uential in creating the British labor exchanges could
be highlighted as an exception, it seems to be unthinkable that the
monograph provided a standard framework by which people in those
days could address the unemployment problem13).
Pigou's \Memorandum" (1907a) also does not deal with \the problems
13) Beveridge's Unemployment, however, had a considerable in°uence on early
Pigou's employment theory. See Pigou(1912: 299, 311n, 313, 315n, 328, 337,
391n, 403; 1913: 26, 151, 217). It is probable that Pigou's interest in
unemployment was sparked by Beveridge.
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that were to concern him so deeply in later years the problems
of the causes and remedies for general unemployment" (McBriar 1987:
254-256). For instance, Pigou set out there only the ¯rst and second
propositions of his welfare economics; his third proposition had not yet
appeared.
Economic well-being depends upon two things, the size of the national
dividend of goods and services annually available for consumption by
the community and the manner in which this dividend is distributed
among the di®erent members of the community (Pigou 1907a: 987).
Therefore there is no denying that, in the 1907 \Memorandum," Pigou
does not recognize the signi¯cance of general unemployment in relation
to the poverty problem. However, it seems to be natural to speculate
that after having submitted \Memorandum" to the Commission, he
heard of the public work plans that were being discussed by the Poor
Law Committee. It is probable that these discussions prompted him
to embark on a study of general unemployment that stemmed from
business cycles and the like versus particular unemployment, which
was the main subject of Poor Law relief and to examine such public
work plans as counter-cyclical policies by which to reduce involuntary
idleness (McBriar 1987: 258n).
Indeed, in his \Memorandum," Pigou does not refer to general
unemployment or such public work plans (Pigou 1907a). However, in his
inaugural lecture delivered in the following year namely, Economic
Science in Relation to Practice he takes up \the great problem of
Unemployment" as one of its central themes, and voices approval for a
certain type of public work scheme (Pigou 1908b: 23, 27-29). It should
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be noted that the public work policy that Pigou discusses in the lecture
was not his original idea, but rather his commentary on such a policy
proposal by the Poor Law Committee. As we see later, there were two
di®erent types of public work scheme: one was advocated by the Majority
Commissioners, and the other by the Minority Commissioners14).
This inaugural lecture can be considered a manifestation of his ideal
or research program of economic science; it seems that the title of the
lecture itself points to the essence of his welfare economics. I point
out the following two reasons why general unemployment was a focus
of the lecture. First, being a®ected by the various discussions in the
Poor Law Committee especially the public work plans for reducing
the number of unemployed individuals he keenly realized the need
to create a theory of employment and economic °uctuation that could
systematically address those topics. Second, such theory would have
been essential to the completion of his practical economics or welfare
economics.
Various discussions of the Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief
of Distress evidently had an in°uence on Pigou in the course of forming
his welfare economics; his interest in the unemployment problem was
similarly aroused by such discussions. Glancing at the index of Wealth
and Welfare, we ¯nd \The Report of Royal Commission of Poor Law
and Relief of Distress" to be by far the most frequently referenced
source material; therefore, we can say that Poor Law Reform marks a
predominant moment in the formation of Pigou's welfare economics.
4. \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness"
Given that Pigou has been frequently considered a typical \classical
14) Pigou contrasts and examines these two schemes in \The Problem of Involuntary
Idleness" (Pigou 1911).
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economist" who never admits to the existence of involuntary unemployment,
Pigou's early article on \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness" (1911)
may seem somewhat paradoxical. To date, this article has been largely
neglected in the secondary literature. In this respect, a re-examination
of Pigou's early employment theory would directly a®ect interpretations
of the \Keynesian revolution" of the 1930s15).
The article was presented at an international conference on unemployment
held in Paris on September 18-21, 1910; it was published the following
year16). It consists of (1) an explanation of the term \involuntary
idleness," (2) an analysis of the causes of involuntary idleness in general,
(3) an examination of two di®erent types of public work plans for
mitigating economic °uctuations, advocated respectively by the Majority
and Minority of Poor Law Commissioners, and (4) an analysis of those
factors that determine the distribution of involuntary idleness among
workers.
It is natural to assume that Pigou began to write Wealth and Welfare
following his inaugural lecture in 1908. Although to date we know
little of the work's developmental process in the 1908-1912 period, his
work \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness" must provide clues to this
question. When considering the formation of his welfare economics, this
1911 article surely has exceptional signi¯cance, along with the well-known
15) Many scholars consider Keynes's judgment against Pigou unfair (Winch 1970:
153; Hutchison 1978: 198-199; Collard 1981: 123-125; Aslanbeigui 1992). I
align myself with these authors.
16) On my visit to University of Cambridge in 2005, I found this stapled-paper
article to be housed as an ordinary book in the University's Marshall Library
of Economics. I learned later that the article had been published in the
conference proceedings. I am grateful to Professor Gilbert Faccarello of
Universit¶e Panth¶eon-Assas and Sorbonne Universit¶es for valuable information.
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article \Producers' and Consumers' Surplus" (Pigou 1910a)17).
At the beginning of the 1911 article, Pigou speaks of \involuntary
idleness," a term seldom used at that time. The popular term that
newspapers and politicians used was \unemployment." Pigou, however,
insisted that the term \involuntary idleness" bore an advantage, as
\unemployment" as the term was ordinarily used covers only a
certain proportion of the wider phenomenon of involuntary idleness.
For example, unemployment was often contrasted with \short time,"
or the reduction of working hours; today, the term popularly used
is \underemployed." Therefore, persons on \short time" were not
considered unemployed. Unemployment and short time are, however, in
great measure consequences of the same causes (Pigou 1911: 1)
4-1 The Causes of Involuntary Idleness
Pigou clari¯es the causes of involuntary idleness by examining the
following three cases, in turn.
First, he assumes that the economic world, being in a stationary
state and not subject to °uctuations, consists of a single industry
operating at a single point. In this simplest case, if conditions of perfect
competition prevailed, \involuntary idleness would be impossible." On
the other hand, if free competition were impeded by the enforcement
of an arti¯cial wage rate that exceeds the rate brought about naturally
under competition, involuntary idleness could exist, and the quantity
of idleness would depend on two factors: (1) the amount by which the
arti¯cial wage rate exceeds the natural rate, and (2) the elasticity of
the demand for labor. In relation to this, Pigou mentions that the
17) Of course, Pigou discusses the other subjects in this period, such as taxation
policies (Pigou 1909a, 1909b, 1909e, 1909f) and the method of measuring
elasticity of demand (Pigou 1910b).
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\current opinion concerning a living wage coupled with the provision of
Poor Law Relief" causes involuntary idleness among the lowest grade of
unskilled workers; he also adds, however, that \in stating these results
[he does] not, of course, imply any judgment concerning policy. The
establishment of an arti¯cial wage rate is not proved to be undesirable
by the fact that it causes some involuntary idleness. It also produces
other consequences, and the goodness of these may outweigh the badness
of the involuntary idleness" (Pigou 1911: 2)18).
Second, Pigou assumes that the economic world, subject as it is to
°uctuations, consists of a single industry operating at a single point. In
this case, too, involuntary idleness would be impossible unless an arti¯cial
wage rate were to exist there. The extent of this arti¯cial element itself
depends on two things: (1) the magnitude of the °uctuations in the
demand for labor, and (2) the force of friction impeding the adjustment
of the wage rate to align with downward °uctuations of demand (Pigou
1911: 3). Pigou does not explain explicitly why the extent of the
arti¯cial wage rate depends on the magnitude of the °uctuations in
labor demand, but as we see later, the reason is that the choice of wage
payment system in other words, whether wages are paid in terms of
pieces or time partly depends on the magnitude of the °uctuation
from which the industry in question su®ers.
Third and ¯nally, Pigou assumes that the economic world consists
of various industries that operate at various points, and that they
are subject to various °uctuations in relation to one another. In this
case, a new factor must be taken into account: the mobility of labor
18) Among the bene¯cial consequences such an arti¯cial wage rate produces, one
of the most important is the enhancement of labor productivity by increasing
human capital. Pigou discusses such an e®ect in detail in, for example, Wealth
and Welfare (Pigou 1912: 351-364).
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among industries and places (Pigou 1911: 4). Therefore, the quantity
of involuntary idleness would depend on three factors: (1) the amount
by which the arti¯cial wage rate exceeds the natural rate, (2) the
elasticity of the demand for labor, and (3) the mobility of labor. The
fundamental causes regulating mobility itself include, according to Pigou,
the degree of specialization within the industry in question, the general
ability of workers as distinguished from the technical ability peculiar
to each industry, and the condition of the industries of transport and
communication, inter alia.
Thus, we can say that Pigou' early work already betrays his clear
perception of involuntary idleness: its ultimate cause is wage rigidity,
and its quantity depends on the three aforementioned factors. In this
way, he summarizes his view of the causation of involuntary idleness,
and it seems that this view remained almost unchanged until the 1930s.
Nonetheless, in his 1911 article, he does not touch at all upon the causes
of these °uctuations. The study of them, or of the causes of variability
in national dividend, ¯rst appeared in Part 4 of Wealth and Welfare.
4-2 Two Schemes of Public Works
As mentioned, Pigou does not provide in his 1911 article any analysis
of the causes of °uctuations. Rather, he carefully examines the practical
schemes by which to reduce involuntary idleness; these are schemes
that arise directly from the study of °uctuations: that is, the schemes
of public work for that purpose. There were two types of scheme:
that advocated by the Majority of the Poor Law Committee, and that
advocated by the Minority.
The former scheme was that \certain work, over which the State or
municipalities have control, should be deliberately held over in times of
good trade to be executed in times of depression. The idea, of course, is
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that by this arrangement °uctuations in the demand for labour would
be diminished, and, therefore, that, taking one year with another, the
quantity of involuntary idleness would also be diminished" (Pigou 1911:
4). Such planning is made from a local rather than national point
of view, and it necessarily does not resort to the public bond. Pigou
generally approves of this type of public work scheme.
On the other hand, the latter scheme was that the state or municipalities
should transfer works controlled by them from boom times to slack
times, \not merely when that work is inherently spasmodic, but even
when it would in the ordinary course have been regular." This latter
scheme is essentially di®erent from the former one. Pigou explains the
point as follows:
Let the resources devoted to the employment of labour at two points
be represented by the symbols A and B. The schemes [proposed by
the Majority Commissioners] ¢ ¢ ¢ are such as to increase the stability
(A + B) either by increasing the stability of one of these two or
by leaving the stability of each of them unaltered and so adjusting
things that the high points of A's range of values synchronize
with the low points of B's range. The proposals of the Minority
Commissioners, however, go beyond this. They would endeavour to
increase the collective steadiness of (A + B) even when in order
to do this, it is necessary to decrease the individual steadiness of
B. A policy of this kind will not in all cases diminish the quantity
of involuntary idleness on the whole (Pigou 1911: 4-5).
Pigou points out that the scheme of the Minority Commissioners
would increase the quantity of involuntary idleness, unless there were
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su±cient labor mobility, and that the larger the measure of mobility is,
the more likely it would be that the quantity of involuntary idleness
would decrease (Pigou 1911: 5-6). Incidentally, this argument reappears
in the ¯nal chapter of Wealth and Welfare, entitled \Philanthropic and
State Action Designed to Lessen the Variability of the Demand for
Labour." These are thought to have been in°uenced by Beveridge.
4-3 Distribution of Involuntary Idleness
Pigou's employment theory, as found in his early work, has been
discussed thus far mainly in relation to his view on public work as
a counter-cyclical policy. In contrast, his pioneering study on the
distribution of involuntary idleness, which is also an essential component
of that theory, has been almost completely disregarded. However, the
problem of whether such idleness spreads widely and evenly over a large
number of people or concentrates mainly among a small number of
individuals is worth studying, especially \from the standpoint of social
welfare" (Pigou 1911: 6-7).
Pigou lays down the following two propositions and examines them in
turn: (1) involuntary idleness tends to be concentrated more narrowly,
the smaller are the °uctuations in demand to which any form of labor
is exposed, and (2) when the magnitude of these °uctuations is given,
involuntary idleness tends to be concentrated more narrowly, the greater
is the advantage that entrepreneurs can obtain by employing certain
groups of workers, in preference to certain other groups (Pigou 1911: 7).
According to Pigou, the main reason behind the ¯rst proposition
is that entrepreneurs can obtain general advantages by employing the
same workers continuously, for those workers tend to enhance their
abilities and e±ciencies by engaging continuously at the same workplace.
Therefore, among certain workers, involuntary idleness in a relatively
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stable industry would tend to take the form of \unemployment," or
outright job loss: in other words, it would tend to be highly concentrated.
The reason for the second proposition is the discrepancy among the
\e±ciency wages" among various workers. Since less-e±cient workers are
more expensive for an employer, he or she must prefer to concentrate
involuntary idleness on them alone, rather than distribute it, taking
the form of \short time," among all the workers. The extent of the
discrepancy among e±ciency wages depends in considerable measure
on the system of wage payment: the piece-wage system, under which
discrepancies are likely to be small, is favorable to the method of
spreading the distribution of involuntary idleness, while the time-wage
system, under which the discrepancy is likely to be large, is favorable to
the concentration method. In the former method, involuntary idleness
tends to take the form of \short time," while in the latter method, it
takes the form of \unemployment" (Pigou 1911: 8-9).
This argument implies that if we hope to achieve a more even distribution
of involuntary idleness, then discrepancies among the e±ciency wages
of various workers must not be overly large. Incidentally, in Wealth and
Welfare, we can see Pigou's more detailed argument on the distribution
aspect of involuntary idleness (Pigou 1912: Part 3, Chapter 4, \Methods
of Engagement of Labour"). Furthermore, several paragraphs that deal
with distribution, as found in the 1911 article, also appear later in the
book19).
4-4 The Original Goal of Pigou's Welfare Economics
In the concluding section of \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness,"
Pigou refers to the circumstances of the time when he started to study
19) Compare \The Problem of Involuntary Idleness" (Pigou 1911: 9-10) to Wealth
and Welfare (Pigou 1912: 338-339).
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the unemployment problem.
The truth is that some years ago I became ambitious to study the
problem of unemployment. In pursuing that study I have found the
subject so intertwined with many widely separated parts of economic
science that any adequate discussion of it in a monograph devoted
to it alone to say nothing of a brief paper has seemed utterly
impracticable (Pigou 1911: 10).
Moreover, we see almost the exact same passages in the ¯rst paragraph
of the preface of Wealth and Welfare:
Several years ago I began to study the causes of unemployment.
It soon became apparent, however, that these causes are so closely
interwoven with the general body of economic activity that an
isolated treatment of them is scarcely practicable. Hence the gradual
growth and more extended scope of the present volume (Pigou 1912:
vii).
These two quotations suggest that the original goal or spur of Wealth
and Welfare was to resolve the unemployment problem (Hutchison 1953:
284-285), and that in order to attain this goal, he needed to research
not only the business cycle or \the variability of the national dividend"
(Wealth and Welfare, Part IV), but also the allocation (ibid, Part II) and
distribution (ibid, Part III) of resources. In a sense, Pigou's monograph
Unemployment ?1913a? can be considered a sequel to that research
program.
It should be noted that the standard theory on employment or on
|229|
?????? 69 ?? 2 ?
the business cycle scarcely existed in the English-speaking world at that
time: the period around 1910 was the very dawn of business cycle theory.
Under such circumstances, Pigou \became ambitious" about studying it
theoretically. His commitment to the research program was more serious
than is generally appreciated; he continued, with great eagerness, to
improve upon that theory after publishing Wealth and Welfare in 1912
(Pigou 1913a, 1913b, 1920, 1927, 1933).
5. Conclusion
The main point of Pigou's welfare economics was to construct practical
instruments by which to resolve the poverty problem which had been
discovered by the well-known investigation of C. Booth. We could even
say that this was the driving force that turned Pigou's mind from
philosophy to economics. The poverty problem was followed by the Poor
Law Reform and Liberal Welfare Reform in the early 20th century.
Pigou became the Professor of Political Economy at the University of
Cambridge in the midst of these reforms, and it was at that time that
he wrote his ¯rst large book, Wealth and Welfare.
In constructing such instruments, the most di±cult and pressing
challenge for him was to analyze systematically the causes of general
unemployment. It is probable that he began to study this problem
immediately after submitting \Memorandum on Some Economic Aspects
and E®ects of Poor Law Relief" (Pigou 1907a). One of the fruits of that
work albeit not at that time completely ripe was \The Problem
of Involuntary Idleness" (Pigou 1911).
We can draw three conclusions: (1) an important origin of Pigou's
economics is the discovery of poverty, made possible by the exploration
of the activities of social workers like Booth, and (2) Poor Law Reform
and Liberal Welfare Reform were at work in the background of the
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formation of his welfare economics. In focusing attention on his deep and
sustained interest in charity or other voluntary actions, we can consider
his practical economics a blueprint for a welfare society. Additionally, (3)
especially in the 1908-1912 period, we can even say that the formation
of his welfare economics was driven by the very process of examining
the unemployment problem.
The theory of industrial °uctuations or business cycles, embodied in
Part IV of Wealth and Welfare and entitled \The Variability of the
National Dividend"20), should be considered an essential part of the
book. In spite of it, the intrinsic connection between Pigou's welfare
economics and the unemployment problem has been generally ignored in
the conventional popular view; a historical study of Pigou's early work,
however, shows that ignoring this connection is a fundamental error.
The most important element in the formation of his welfare economics
was his deep interest in the problems of poverty and unemployment.
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